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Note 
 
Defining Unpatented Article: Why Labeling 
Products with Expired Patent Numbers Should 
Not Be False Marking 
Laura N. Arneson∗ 
Many of the products and packages that we use every day 
are marked with a patent number: shampoo bottles, tools, ciga-
rette lighters, coffee cup lids, pharmaceuticals, even food.1 Re-
cently, many lawsuits have been filed asserting that products 
such as these are falsely marked because the patent referred to 
is expired.2 In each of these cases, the plaintiff seeks a large 
award, in the millions or billions of dollars.3 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2001, 
St. Olaf College; Ph.D., 2007, Mayo Graduate School. Thank you to Professor 
Thomas Cotter, Thomas Spielbauer, and Bonnie Nestor for invaluable advice 
and editing. My sincere appreciation also belongs to the Editors and Staff of 
the Minnesota Law Review, especially Joe Hansen and Jeremy Harrell. Copy-
right © 2010 by Laura N. Arneson. 
 1. E.g., High Performance Color-Depositing Shampoo, U.S. Patent No. 
6,500,413 (filed Apr. 12, 2000); Liquid Gas-Operated Lighter, Particularly 
Pocket Lighter, U.S. Patent No. 4,496,309 (filed Mar. 18, 1992); Oral Sus-
tained Release Acetaminophen Formulation and Process, U.S. Patent No. 
4,968,509 (filed Jan. 19, 1989); Lid for Drinking Cup, U.S. Patent No. 
4,589,569 (filed Aug. 22, 1984); Calorie-Free Sweetener Without Sourness, 
U.S. Patent No. 3,946,121 (filed Aug. 8, 1974). 
 2. See, e.g., Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (E.D. Va. 
2009), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Stauf-
fer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d, Nos. 
2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010); 
Amended Verified Complaint at 5, Brinkmeier v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 
684 F. Supp. 2d 548 (D. Del 2010) (No. 09-cv-00262-JJF), 2010 WL 2519463; 
Verified Complaint at 3–4, Brinkmeier v. BIC Corp., No. 09-cv-00860-SLR (D. 
Del. Nov. 13, 2009), 2009 WL 4899522; Complaint for False Patent Marking at 
9, Pub. Patent Found., Inc. v. McNEIL-PPC, Inc., No. 09-cv-05471 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 15, 2009), 2009 WL 5000584 [hereinafter McNEIL Complaint]; Com-
plaint for False Patent Marking at 4, Pub. Patent Found., Inc. v. Cumberland 
Packing Corp., No. 09-cv-04360-MGC (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2009), 2009 WL 
3121111 [hereinafter Cumberland Complaint]; see also Dionne Searcey, New 
Breed of Patent Claim Bedevils Product Makers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2010, at 
A1; McDonnell, Boehnen, Hulbert & Berghoff, LLP, Cases: District Court, 
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The “false marking statute,” § 292(a) of the Patent Act, 
states, in part, “Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in 
advertising in connection with any unpatented article, the word 
‘patent’ or any word or number importing that the same is pat-
ented for the purpose of deceiving the public . . . [s]hall be fined 
not more than $500 for every such offense.”4 In many of the re-
cent false marking cases, the plaintiffs are not asserting any 
individual harm; rather, they are taking advantage of a qui 
tam provision in the false marking statute that allows any per-
son—even one uninjured by the violation—to sue and collect a 
proportion of the penalty.5 If the plaintiff is successful, one-half 
of the award goes to the person suing and the other half to the 
United States.6  
Traditionally, cases brought under the false marking stat-
ute asserted that the product marked with a patent number 
was never covered by the claims of the patent.7 However, more 
 
FALSE PATENT MARKING, http://www.falsemarking.net/district.php (last vis-
ited Nov. 08, 2010) (compiling a list of the false marking cases currently filed). 
 3. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Solo Cup Company’s Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 2, 
Solo Cup, 646 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 07-cv-00897) [hereinafter Solo Cup Motion 
to Dismiss] (noting that plaintiff ’s demands for $500 per article amounted to a 
claim for more than $100 billion); see also Matthew Barakat, Legal Quirk Lets 
Anyone Sue over Old Patents, DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.), June 16, 
2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 11621736 (discussing a federal court rul-
ing that allows a person to sue on behalf of the government if they have evi-
dence that a company is guilty of false marking). 
 4. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006).  
 5. Id. § 292(b) (“Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event one-
half shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of the United States.”). 
 6. Id. The award for false marking is up to $500 per offense. Id. § 292(a). 
 7. Of the thirteen circuit court cases that have been decided, only three 
involved the issue of marking with expired patents: Arcadia and the two most 
recent decisions, Solo Cup and Stauffer. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., Nos. 
2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419, at *3–6 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 
31, 2010) (concluding that Stauffer had standing to sue for false marking); Pe-
quignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that So-
lo Cup had falsely marked its products by labeling them with expired patent 
numbers, but lacked the intent to deceive required for liability); Forest Group, 
Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that Forest 
Group’s marking of stilts after the district court had construed the patents not 
to cover the stilts was false marking); Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 
406 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (examining whether there was false 
marking because Invitrogen marked products with multiple patent numbers 
when not every patent applied to the product); Boyd v. Schildkraut Giftware 
Corp., 936 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that accidental marking with an 
inapplicable patent number does not constitute false marking); Arcadia Mach. 
& Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 1124, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (find-
ing no false marking because the errors in labeling were “inadvertent, the re-
  
652 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:650 
 
recently, noncompetitor plaintiffs have begun bringing cases for 
violation of the false marking statute against patentees that 
mark products with the number of a patent that has expired, 
even though the marked product is covered by the claims of the 
patent.8 A number of recent Federal Circuit decisions have en-
couraged plaintiffs to bring this type of case.  
In the past year, the Federal Circuit greatly increased the 
potential payoff for plaintiffs bringing false marking claims. In 
2009, the court held that each article marked constitutes an 
“offense” for which a patentee may be fined up to $500.9 By re-
jecting the interpretation of several district courts that an “of-
fense” meant a decision to mark,10 the court greatly increased 
the incentive for plaintiffs to bring suits alleging false marking. 
Then, in 2010, the Federal Circuit held that, for the purposes of 
the false marking statute, an article covered by the claims of a 
patent becomes an “unpatented article” when the patent ex-
pires.11 Moreover, the Federal Circuit also held that virtually 
any consumer has the right to bring an action against a manu-
facturer for false marking.12 These decisions have resulted in 
 
sult of oversight, or caused by patent expirations”); Mayview Corp. v. Rod-
stein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1360 (9th Cir. 1980) (remanding to the district court to 
determine if the defendants had an intent to deceive the public); Brose v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 769 (5th Cir. 1972) (determining whether 
there had been mismarking when the marked article was not covered by the 
cited patent); Filmon Process Corp. v. Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d 1351, 1354 
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (finding that Spell-Right had continued to mark its product as 
patented even though it was no longer using the patented process to make the 
product); Santa Anita Mfg. Corp. v. Lugash, 369 F.2d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 1966) 
(holding that there was no false marking even though some products were 
marked with two patent numbers when only one applied); G. Leblanc Corp. v. 
H. & A. Selmer, Inc., 310 F.2d 449, 460 (7th Cir. 1962) (determining whether 
the elements of false marking were met when the plaintiff had advertised an 
article as patented even though no patents had been filed); Graffius v. Weath-
er-Seal, 165 F.2d 782, 782–83 (6th Cir. 1948) (affirming the district court’s de-
termination that the article was not marked in a way that implied it was pa-
tented and that the defendant had not marked with an intent to deceive the 
public); London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 508 (1st Cir. 1910) 
(emphasizing that even when an unpatented article is marked as patented an 
intent to deceive the public is also required for false marking). 
 8. E.g., Amended Complaint for False Patent Marking at 8, Solo Cup, 
646 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 07-cv-00897), 2007 WL 4885280 (alleging that Solo 
had marked billions of plastic cup lids with an expired patent number); 
McNEIL Complaint, supra note 2, at 6–9 (alleging that McNEIL falsely marked 
Tylenol® by labeling its packaging with expired patent numbers). 
 9. Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1304. 
 10. Id. at 1302. 
 11. Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1361.  
 12. Stauffer, 2010 WL 3397419, at *4. 
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an onslaught of lawsuits against manufacturers who mark 
their products with the numbers of expired patents.13 
This Note concludes that, in contrast to the Federal Cir-
cuit’s recent holding, a product once covered by a valid patent 
that has now expired should not be considered an unpatented 
article for the purposes of § 292(a). Excluding products covered 
by expired patents from the definition of “unpatented article” 
would prevent exploitative litigation and furthers the false 
marking statute’s purpose. Part I describes the history of mark-
ing, the purposes of the false marking statute, and the courts’ 
interpretations of the statute. Part II examines the effects on 
public policy and litigation of treating a product as an unpat-
ented article after its protecting patent has expired. Part III 
proposes that the Federal Circuit should reverse its recent de-
cisions and hold that a product covered by an expired patent 
should not be considered an unpatented article under § 292(a). 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT MARKING AND 
FALSE MARKING   
The patent false marking statute, § 292(a), prevents mark-
ing an “unpatented article” with “the word ‘patent’ or any word 
or number importing that the same is patented for the purpose 
of deceiving the public.”14 The Federal Circuit has recently held 
that “unpatented article” should encompass not only articles for 
which a patent has never been issued, but also articles that are 
covered by the claims of an expired, but once valid, patent.15 In 
order to determine if this expanded interpretation of the false 
marking statute is consistent with its historical application and 
purpose, the following sections detail the history of the false 
marking statute, the policy reasons for regulating marking of 
patented articles, and the ways in which courts have inter-
preted the statute in prior litigation. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FALSE MARKING STATUTE 
Congress first introduced the false marking statute in 
1842, imposing a penalty on any person marking as patented 
“any thing . . . [for] which he hath not or shall not have ob-
tained letters patent.”16 The statute also penalized infringers 
 
 13. Searcey, supra note 2, at A1. 
 14. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006). 
 15. Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1361. 
 16. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5, 5 Stat. 543, 544. 
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who had not purchased or licensed the article from the patent-
ee, but nevertheless marked their product as patented with the 
intent to “counterfeit[]” and with the “purpose of deceiving the 
public.”17 Congress revised the false marking statute in 1870 
when it updated the Patent Act, again imposing a penalty on 
any person who marked as patented anything for which “he has 
not obtained a patent” and on persons who marked with the 
“intent to imitate or counterfeit.”18 Congress further extended 
the penalty to persons who mark “any unpatented article [with] 
the word ‘patent,’ or any word importing that the same is pa-
tented, for the purpose of deceiving the public.”19 In the most 
recent major revision to the Patent Act in 1952, Congress codi-
fied the false marking statute as 35 U.S.C. § 292, making it an 
“ordinary criminal action.”20 The House Report described the 
statute as “relating to falsely marking an article as being pa-
tented when it was not patented.”21 In its current form, the sta-
tute still applies to those who mark articles without the consent 
of the patentee and also to “[w]hoever . . . marks upon, or affix-
es to, or uses in advertising in connection with any unpatented 
article, the word ‘patent’ or any word or number importing that 
the same is patented for the purpose of deceiving the public.”22 
Initially, Congress used the false marking statute to im-
pose a marking obligation, requiring that every patented article 
be marked with the date the patent issued.23 Because the term 
of the patent was measured from the time of issue, this meant 
that the expiration of the patent was easily discernible from the 
 
 17. Id.; see also G. Leblanc Corp. v. H. & A. Selmer, Inc., 310 F.2d 449, 
459 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding that an intent to deceive the public is a prerequi-
site to finding a party guilty of false marking). This intent element prevents 
the false marking statute from creating strict liability for false marking. Clon-
tech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 18. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 39, 16 Stat. 198, 203. 
 19. Id. 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 10 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2403. The most current version of the statute includes amendments made 
in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, but these changes only 
pertained to the location of the use and sale of the article. Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(b)(6), 108 Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994). 
 21. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 10. The legislative history on record for the 
statute’s incorporation into the 1952 Patent Act is very sparse. Solo Cup Mo-
tion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 9. 
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006); see also Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352 (refusing 
to render the false marking statute a statute of strict liability and maintaining 
the “intent to deceive” requirement). 
 23. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 6, 5 Stat. 543, 544–45. 
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marking information.24 In 1870, Congress eliminated the mark-
ing requirement, replacing it with a statute that incentivized 
marking by making recovery of damages contingent on mark-
ing.25 In its most recent revision in 1952, Congress continued to 
provide an incentive to mark by requiring that the article be 
marked as patented in order to satisfy the notice requirement 
used in calculating damages against infringers.26 
When Congress first introduced the false marking statute 
in 1842, it imposed a minimum $100 penalty.27 In 1870, it pre-
served a $100 minimum penalty “for every such offense.”28 In 
the most recent major revision to the Patent Act in 1952, the 
penalty for false marking was changed to a maximum of $500 
“per offense.”29 Due to the inclusion of a qui tam provision in 
the statute, half the penalty imposed on the defendant is taken 
by the party bringing the action.30 
Congress included a qui tam provision when it first 
enacted the false marking statute, stipulating that one-half of 
any penalty recovered should be paid to “any person or persons 
who shall sue.”31 Qui tam is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase 
qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, 
which translates to “who as well for the king as for himself sues 
in this matter.”32 Qui tam, or “informer,” actions allow a private 
person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government re-
 
 24. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW 
AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 59 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that historically 
the term of a U.S. patent was fixed). 
 25. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 38, 16 Stat. 198, 203 (1870). 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). A patent holder can only recover damages for 
infringement from the date it began marking the article or gave adequate no-
tice to the infringer that the article was patented. Preston Moore & Jackie 
Nakamura, The United States Patent Marking and Notice Statute, 22 AIPLA 
Q.J. 85, 90–91 (1994). 
 27. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5. 
 28. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 39. 
 29. Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). The Federal Circuit’s holding in this case settled a controversy regard-
ing how to define an “offense” for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 292. Forest 
Group, 590 F.3d at 1302–03; see also Donald W. Rupert, Trolling for Dollars: A 
New Threat to Patent Owners, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Mar. 2009, at 4. 
The Federal Circuit decided that Congress meant “per offense” to mean per 
article sold, not to refer to each time a decision to mark was made. Forest 
Group, 590 F.3d at 1302–03. 
 30. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 5–6 (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40785.pdf. 
 31. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5. 
 32. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004). 
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ceives.33 Today, the false marking statute is one of only three 
remaining federal qui tam statutes in the United States.34 Like 
other informer statutes, the false marking statute offers re-
wards “as a matter of public policy to accomplish outlawing of 
fraudulent and illegal acts to the public detriment.”35 Histori-
cally, the qui tam action has almost always been brought by a 
competitor in the context of patent litigation.36 However, the 
party bringing the action need not be a victim.37 In qui tam 
suits, the United States—not the plaintiff bringing the action—
must have suffered an injury, and the government “is therefore 
the real plaintiff in the action.”38 
As part of the Patent Act, the false marking statute is gov-
erned by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.39 The 
Federal Circuit applies a four part test to determine if labeling 
as patented rises to the level of false marking: (1) that a mark-
ing imports that the article is patented, (2) that the marking is 
 
 33. DOYLE, supra note 30, at 1. 
 34. Id. at 4. The other statutes are the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729–3733 (2009), and the Indian Protection Provision of 25 U.S.C. § 201 
(2006). See DOYLE, supra note 30, at 5–8, 21–22. 
 35. Calderwood v. Mansfield, 71 F. Supp. 480, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1947) (refus-
ing to find false marking where metal watch wrist bands were marked with a 
design patent number that did not cover the product because plaintiff could 
not demonstrate a purpose to deceive the public). 
 36. Brose v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1972) (“As 
is true in nearly all of the relatively few qui tam informer actions brought in 
the past one and a quarter century this one is used as a weapon in the arsenal 
of patent litigation . . . .”); Filmon Process Corp. v. Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d 
1351, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“That provision is designed to protect the exclu-
siveness of the use of the invention granted to the patentee. The patentee is 
given this remedy to protect his patent position, and as a practical matter, the 
patentee is the only likely enforcer of it, as recovery requires proof that the 
statements were made without his consent.”). 
 37. Cf. Christina L. Brown & Taffie N. Jones, Proposed Legislation Under 
the Patent Reform Act, MCDONNELL BOEHNEN HULBERT & BERGHOFF LLP’S 
FALSE MARKING NOTES & COMMENTS (Mar. 22, 2010), http://falsemarkingmbhb 
.typepad.com/mbhbs-false-marking-notes-comments/2010/03/propsed-legislation 
-under-the-patent-reform-act.html (describing proposed amendments that 
would require a false marking plaintiff to have suffered competitive injury); 
R. David Donoghue, Patent Reform Act Has False Marking in Its Sites, CHI. IP 
LIT. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.chicagoiplitigation.com/2010/04/articles/ 
legal-news/patent-reform-act-has-false-marking-in-its-sites/ (same).  
 38. United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1212 (7th 
Cir. 1995). 
 39. Since its establishment in 1982, the Federal Circuit has been solely 
responsible for appeals of cases arising under the patent laws. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295 (2000); Brian H. Redmond, Annotation, Jurisdiction of United States 
Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1292 and 1295, 97 
A.L.R. FED. 694, 713–39 (1990). 
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falsely affixed to (3) an unpatented article, and (4) that the 
marking of the article as patented was done with a purpose of 
deceiving the public.40 
B. THE POLICIES BEHIND THE REGULATION OF MARKING 
Marking articles with a patent number can serve a variety 
of purposes for the patentee, the consumer, and the patentee’s 
competitors. In regulating marking, Congress and the courts 
have sought to balance the costs and benefits of marking to 
both the patentee and the public, paralleling the more general 
policies of patent protection.41 The main functions of marking 
an article with a patent number are to protect the public, to de-
ter mismarking, to provide notice to potential infringers, and to 
allow the public to identify a product’s intellectual property sta-
tus.42 
Marking protects “the public against the fraudulent use of 
the word patent.”43 Marking an unpatented article as patented 
allows the marker to mislead the public44 and enjoy the bene-
fits of patenting, including status recognition and even poten-
tial monopoly rights, without providing the corresponding bene-
fits to society.45 Preventing unscrupulous persons from 
 
 40. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); see also Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1359 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 41. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 626–32 
(2002) (discussing a traditional view of the costs, rights, and rewards of patent 
ownership and the “exchange of information for protection”). One of the justifi-
cations for the patent system is the assumption that intellectual property pro-
tections motivate inventors to reveal information to the public that they would 
otherwise keep secret. Id. at 625–26. 
 42. Accent Designs, Inc. v. Jan Jewelry Designs, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 957, 
969 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing the false marking statute’s function as a de-
terrent of competitors’ false marking activity); Bonnie Grant, Deficiencies and 
Proposed Recommendations to the False Marking Statute: Controlling Use of 
the Term ‘Patent Pending’, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 283, 284–85 (2004) (discuss-
ing the functions of putting infringers on notice and allowing the public to 
identify the intellectual property status of a product). 
 43. Oliphant v. Salem Flouring Mills Co., 18 F. Cas. 647, 647 (D. Or. 
1878) (No. 10,486). 
 44. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1356–57 (“[T]he act of false marking misleads 
the public into believing that a patentee controls the article in question 
. . . and increases the cost to the public of ascertaining whether a patentee in 
fact controls the intellectual property embodied in an article.”). 
 45. See Elizabeth I. Winston, The Flawed Nature of the False Marking 
Statute, 77 TENN. L. REV. 111, 124 (2009) (“Indicating that an item is patented 
when no patent has issued represents the clearest examples of harm to the 
public and to the patent system.”); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (discussing how the federal patent laws 
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“imposing upon the community by the unauthorized and false 
use of the word ‘patent’” was early recognized to be one of the 
purposes of the false marking statute.46 It is now “well settled” 
that that this protection is one of the purposes of the false 
marking statute.47 
Marking deters manufacturers from implying that an ar-
ticle is patented when no application has been applied for or re-
ceived.48 A manufacturer mismarks a product when it labels 
the article with an inapplicable patent number.49 The U.S. pat-
ent laws were designed to “confer on the authors of useful in-
ventions an exclusive right in their inventions.”50 In order to 
maintain the value of this exclusive right, it is necessary to 
“protect a patentee against the fraudulent use of his name or 
device.”51 To this end, the statute allows the penalization of 
those who would “palm off upon the public unpatented articles, 
by falsely and fraudulently representing them to have been 
patented.”52 Indeed, in almost all patent false marking cases, 
the defendant was accused of marking a product with a patent 
number that had never applied to the product being sold.53 
 
balance the “tension between the desire to freely exploit” inventions and the 
“need to create an incentive” to invent); Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Ap-
proach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 41–42 (2008) (discuss-
ing the costs and benefits of the patent system to society). 
 46. Oliphant, 18 F. Cas. at 647.  
 47. Accent Designs, 827 F. Supp. at 969; see also Calderwood v. Mansfield, 
71 F. Supp. 480, 482 (N.D. Cal. 1947) (“Obviously the statutory object is to pe-
nalize those who would palm off upon the public unpatented articles, by false-
ly and fraudulently representing them to have been patented.”). 
 48. See Accent Designs, 827 F. Supp. at 969 (“It is well settled that Section 
292 was intended to protect . . . against . . . words imparting that an applica-
tion for patent had been made when no application had been made or if made, 
is not pending.”). 
 49. See Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352–53 (“[I]n order to establish knowledge 
of falsity the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
party accused of false marking did not have a reasonable belief that the ar-
ticles were properly marked (i.e., covered by a patent).”); Brose v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 768 (5th Cir. 1972) (“[I]f a device claimed to be covered 
by license of a cited patent is so obviously not revealed by it as the patentese 
world would view it, the use of such a legend would be mismarking.”). 
 50. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241 (1832). 
 51. Accent Designs, 827 F. Supp. at 969.  
 52. Forest Group, Inc., v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206, 
at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008) (citing Calderwood, 71 F. Supp. at 482), aff’d in 
part and vacated in part, 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 53. See, e.g., Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1351–52 (noting that Invitrogen’s 
products were not covered by the claims of the patents they were marked with 
and never had been). 
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Another primary function of marking is to allow the mark-
er to provide notice to potential infringers that the product is 
patented. Under 35 U.S.C. § 292(a), a patentee is considered to 
have given notice to the public that the product is patented 
simply by labeling the article with “the word ‘patent’ or the ab-
breviation ‘pat.’, together with the number of the patent.”54 
Congress incentivized marking by stipulating that marking 
serves as notice of infringement and may be used as the basis 
for calculating damages against infringers.55  
Marking allows the public to identify the product’s intellec-
tual property status. The federal patent statutes were designed 
to inform the public and allow competitors and consumers to 
determine if a product is patented.56 Marking is meant to pro-
vide “a ready means of discerning the status of intellectual 
property”57 and to help prevent innocent competitors from be-
coming infringers.58 When an article is falsely marked as pat-
ented it “increases the cost to the public of ascertaining wheth-
er a patentee in fact controls the intellectual property embodied 
in an article.”59 Thus, by marking an article with a patent 
number a manufacturer not only protects its own interests but 
also informs and protects the public and its potential competi-
tors. 
 
 
 
 54. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006). 
 55. Id.; see, e.g., Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 
1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Congress structured . . . [35 U.S.C. § 287] so as to tie 
failure to mark with disability to collect damages . . . .”); Motorola, Inc. v. 
United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“35 U.S.C. § 287 advises a 
patent owner to mark his patented article with a notice of his patent rights. 
Failure to do so limits his recovery of damages to the period after the infringer 
receives notice of the infringement.”); see also Moore & Nakamura, supra note 
26, at 90–91 (discussing the role of marking in a patent holder’s ability to re-
cover from an infringer). 
 56. Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 397 
(1936) (“All these acts reveal the purpose to require that marks be put on pat-
ented articles for the information of the public.”). 
 57. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1356 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)). 
 58. See, e.g., Edward W. Remus & Heather Bjella, Importance of Marking 
and Notice of Infringement: An Update, 77 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 
107, 108 (2008) (explaining the policy of protecting innocent copiers). 
 59. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1356–57. 
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C. CURRENT LITIGATION—EXPIRED PATENTS AND UNPATENTED 
ARTICLES 
Over its nearly 170 years of history, the false marking stat-
ute has been litigated surprisingly little.60 In the cases that 
have arisen, the question of what constitutes an “unpatented 
article” is a common issue. 
In Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., the 
Federal Circuit examined whether including expired patents on 
the label was a violation of the false marking statute.61 The 
court held that the patentee did not violate the false marking 
statute because it had no intent to deceive the public.62 It is 
noteworthy that the court determined that the errors in mark-
ing were “inadvertent, the result of oversight, or caused by pat-
ent expirations.”63 Because an intent to deceive is required for 
liability under the statute, the Federal Circuit’s grouping of 
patent expirations with unintentional acts implied that mark-
ing with expired patents, even if intentional, was insufficient to 
establish liability under the false marking statute.  
The Federal Circuit also addressed how the term “unpat-
ented article” should be determined in Clontech Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp.64 Clontech accused the patentee, Invi-
trogen, of marking products with patents even though the 
products did not fall within the claims of the patents.65 The 
court placed the burden on Clontech to demonstrate the four 
elements of false marking: (1) that Invitrogen’s marking im-
ports that the article is patented, (2) that the marking is falsely 
affixed to (3) an unpatented article, and (4) that the marking of 
the article as patented was done by Invitrogen with the pur-
pose of deceiving the public.66 The court held that Invitrogen 
had marked an unpatented article because “the article in ques-
tion [was] not covered by at least one claim of each patent with 
which the article is marked.”67 Moreover, the court also found 
unpersuasive Invitrogen’s argument that “there [was] no harm 
 
 60. Only thirteen circuit court cases regarding the statute have been de-
cided. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 61. Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 1124, 
1125 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 62. Id. at 1152. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352. 
 65. Id. at 1351. 
 66. Id.; see also Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1359 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
 67. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352. 
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in marking products with patents even when those products do 
not fall within the bounds of properly construed claims” be-
cause the additional marking provides additional information 
to potential infringers.68 Nonetheless, the court did not find In-
vitrogen liable for false marking because Clontech was unable 
to demonstrate Invitrogen did not have an “honest good faith 
belief in marking its products.”69  
Clontech’s definition of an unpatented article as an article 
not “covered by at least one claim of each patent with which the 
article is marked”70 left open the question of whether a court 
should consider an article covered by the claims of expired pat-
ents unpatented. A series of cases were filed against defendants 
whose products were marked with now-expired patents.71 In 
2010, the Federal Circuit was asked to determine specifically if 
such an article, covered by the claims of an expired patent, is 
an unpatented article for the purposes of the false marking 
statute.72 The court held that “an article that is no longer pro-
tected by a patent is not ‘patented,’ and is more aptly described 
as ‘unpatented.’”73 
In Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., a patent attorney sued Solo 
on behalf of the United States for false marking.74 Pequignot 
alleged that Solo had marked its packages, as well as billions of 
 
 68. Id. at 1356. 
 69. Id. at 1355. 
 70. Id. at 1352. 
 71. See, e.g., Brinkmeier v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 
548, 549 (D. Del. 2010) (alleging Graco engaged in false marking by marking 
children’s products and its website with expired patents); Stauffer v. Brooks 
Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (charging Brooks Broth-
ers with falsely marking its adjustable bow ties by marking them with the 
number of a patent that expired more than fifty years ago), rev’d, Nos. 2009-
1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010); 
Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 2, at 5 (asserting that BIC’s labeling 
of lighters with the numbers of now-expired patents constitutes false mark-
ing); McNEIL Complaint, supra note 2, at 4–5 (alleging that Tylenol® packag-
ing is falsely marked because of its inclusion of expired patent numbers); 
Cumberland Complaint, supra note 2, at 4–5 (asserting that Sweet’N Low 
packaging is falsely marked because of its inclusion of expired patent num-
bers); Complaint for False Patent Marking at 5, Pequignot v. Gillette Co., No. 
08-cv-00049 (E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 2008) (alleging that Gillette marked a variety of 
razors, antiperspirants, deodorants, and their packages with expired patent 
numbers).  
 72. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 73. Id. at 1361. 
 74. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (E.D. Va. 2009), 
aff’d in part and vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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lids for hot and cold beverages, with expired patents.75 The 
Federal Circuit agreed with Pequignot that “an article covered 
by a now-expired patent is ‘unpatented.’”76 The Federal Circuit 
cited the district court’s reasoning that “[a]n article that was 
once protected by a now-expired patent is no different [from] an 
article that has never received protection from a patent. Both 
are in the public domain.”77 The Federal Circuit held that the 
statute’s language was unambiguous and so it need not consid-
er legislative history.78  
Although the Federal Circuit noted that the district court 
had stated that when a product is marked with an expired pat-
ent number “‘any person with basic knowledge of the patent 
system can look up the patent and determine its expiration 
date,’”79 the Federal Circuit dismissed this argument because 
“determining the expiration date of a patent can, at times, be 
difficult.”80 The court held that because the term may be al-
tered by the issue date, term adjustments, and payment of 
maintenance feed, marking a patent with an “expired patent 
number imposes on the public ‘the cost of determining whether 
the involved patents are valid and enforceable.’”81 The Federal 
Circuit found that by marking products with expired patent 
numbers, Solo had falsely marked.82 Nevertheless, the Federal 
Circuit held that Solo was not liable for false marking because 
Solo had not acted with intent to deceive.83  
Since the Federal Circuit’s holdings in Bon Tool and Solo 
Cup, the number of false marking cases filed has increased 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1361.  
 77. Id. (alteration in original). 
 78. Id. at 1361–62. 
 79. Id. at 1362 (quoting Solo Cup, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 798). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (quoting Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 
1367 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1364 (“[W]e agree with the district court that Solo has provided 
sufficient evidence that its purpose was not to deceive the public, and that Pe-
quignot has provided no credible contrary evidence.”). The intent to deceive 
the public is part of the four-part test adopted by the Federal Circuit in Clon-
tech. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1351. Even if the patentee has marked the article 
with an inapplicable patent number, it may not be liable for false marking if 
the contestant cannot prove its intent to deceive the public by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Id. at 1355. 
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dramatically.84 Many of these cases were filed not by a competi-
tor or person harmed by the alleged false marking but rather 
by people seeking to employ the qui tam provision of the stat-
ute by making general allegations that marking after patent 
expiration has inhibited competition.85 These plaintiffs have 
filed suits against defendants with high volumes of products, 
seeking the maximum damages for every product labeled since 
expiration of the patent.86 If successful, these plaintiffs would 
collect half of these potentially astronomical awards, establish-
ing an incentive for others to file this type of suit,87 providing a 
means to damage manufacturers’ reputations,88 and ultimately 
creating an incentive for manufacturers not to mark.89 
 
 84. See Mary Alice Robbins, TX Marks the Spot: Texas Ranks First in 
Number of False-Marking Suits Filed, TEXAS LAW., Aug. 2, 2010, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202464074292 (noting the surge 
in false marking suits); Searcey, supra note 2, at A1; Justin Gray, False Mark-
ing Case Information, GRAY ON CLAIMS, http://www.grayonclaims.com/false 
-marking-case-information/ (last updated Nov. 4, 2010) (compiling a list of the 
false marking cases currently filed).  
 85. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Stauffer’s complaint that alleged an injury to the public 
and to the United States because defendant’s conduct had “wrongfully quelled 
competition with respect to such bow tie products,” and further alleged defen-
dants had “wrongfully and illegally” advertised patent monopolies that they 
did not possess), rev’d, Nos. 2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 
3397419 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010); Amended Complaint for False Patent Mark-
ing, supra note 8, at 5 (alleging that “every person in the United States is a 
potential competitor of SOLO CUP” and that the alleged false marking “is 
likely to, or at least has the potential to, discourage or deter each person or 
company” from competing with Solo Cup). Most of the complaints have been 
filed by patent attorneys. See Stauffer, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 251; Pequignot v. 
Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 650 (E.D. Va. 2008).  
 86. Rupert, supra note 29, at 3; see also, e.g., Amended Complaint for 
False Patent Marking, supra note 8, at 10 (alleging that “[e]ach individual lid” 
marked with an expired patent number caused harm to the public and was a 
separate offense under 35 U.S.C. § 292). 
 87. David A. Oblon, Expired-Patent Suits Could Be Windfall for Lawyers, 
VA. LAW. WEEKLY BLOG (June 22, 2009), http://valawyersweekly.com/blog/2009/ 
06/22/expired-patent-suits-could-be-windfall-for-lawyers/. Indeed a significant 
increase in false marking cases has been seen in the past few months, includ-
ing more than twenty filed in one two-day period. Dennis Crouch, False Mark-
ing False Marking False Marking False Marking All at up to $500 Per Offense, 
PATENTLY-O BLOG (Feb. 26, 2010, 7:17 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2010/02/false-marking-false-marking-false-marking-false-marking-all-at-up-to-500 
-per-offense.html. 
 88. Oblon, supra note 87. 
 89. Searcey, supra note 2, at A1 (describing how the increased litigation is 
resulting in lawyers advising their clients not to mark their products with pat-
ent numbers); see also Ed Green, Protecting Your Company from Patent Mark-
ing Bounty Hunters, INTELL. PROP. COUNS., Oct. 2009, at 14. 
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II.  DEFINING FALSE MARKING   
The recent increase in cases brought by third parties to 
challenge the marking of articles with expired patent numbers 
represents a departure from the traditional implementation of 
the false marking statute. This section will contrast how courts 
historically have defined false marking and the Federal Cir-
cuit’s recent holdings, detail the importance of the qui tam ac-
tion to the prevention of false marking, and explore the effects 
of allowing articles to be marked with expired patent numbers. 
This section suggests that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation 
of the false marking statute radically changed the statute’s im-
plementation and incentivized false marking litigation, to the 
detriment of both manufacturers and the public.  
A. THE COURTS’ STRUGGLES TO DEFINE A FALSELY MARKED 
PRODUCT 
Since the introduction of the false marking statute, a major 
aspect of enforcing the statute has been defining what articles 
were falsely marked. In one of the first cases to address the 
marking of products with expired patent numbers, Wilson v. 
Singer Manufacturing Co., an Illinois court was asked to de-
termine if Singer sewing machines labeled with plates stating 
the machine was patented violated the false marking statute.90  
The plate affixed to each machine was inscribed with the 
issue date for each patent that covered the machine, but the 
plates continued to be affixed to the sewing machines after all 
the patents had expired.91 The court found the offense was not 
complete because nothing stamped on the product indicated the 
existence of a “subsisting patent” on the machine.92 
Similarly, in Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger 
& Co., the Federal Circuit failed to explicitly hold that includ-
ing expired patents on the label violated the false marking stat-
ute.93 The court held that the patentee did not violate the false 
marking statute because it had no intent to deceive the pub-
lic.94 However, the court noted that the errors in marking were 
“inadvertent, the result of oversight, or caused by patent expi-
 
 90. Wilson v. Singer Mfg. Co., 12 F. 57, 57–58 (N.D. Ill. 1882). 
 91. Id. at 58–59. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 1124, 
1125 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding instead that there must be a showing that the 
false marking or mismarking was “for the purpose of deceiving the public”). 
 94. Id. 
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rations.”95 Because an intent to deceive is required for liability 
under the statute, the Federal Circuit’s grouping of patent ex-
pirations with unintentional acts implied that marking with 
expired patents, even if intentional, was insufficient to estab-
lish liability under the false marking statute.  
In contrast, more recently in Solo Cup, the Federal Circuit 
held that the term “unpatented article” includes articles that 
fall within the scope of an expired patent.96 The Federal Circuit 
cited the Supreme Court’s language in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.: “An article that ‘has been freely ex-
posed to the public . . . stands in the same stead as an item for 
which a patent has expired or been denied: it is unpatented and 
unpatentable.’”97 In addition, the Federal Circuit rejected Solo’s 
arguments based on policy and legislative history, stating that 
the “statute is unambiguous.”98 Finally, the Federal Circuit 
held that public policy also supported holding that articles 
marked with expired patent numbers were falsely marked.99 
1. Extension of the Supreme Court’s Use of “Unpatentable”  
In deciding Solo Cup, both the district court and the Fed-
eral Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s language in Bonito 
Boats, noting that once “‘a patent has expired or been denied: it 
is unpatented and unpatentable.’”100 There are several reasons 
why the Court’s description of an expired patent as “unpat-
ented” should not be extended to the false marking statute. In 
Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court’s intent was to prevent a 
state from creating patent-like rights for products in addition to 
those of the federal patent system, and it did not address 
 
 95. Id.  
 96. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The 
district court distinguished Wilson, finding that Singer had made the patents’ 
status clear by listing the issuance date for each patent on the product, where-
as Solo Cup’s marking was insufficient to communicate the patent’s status. 
Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 651 (E.D. Va. 2008). At the 
time of the Wilson decision, patent term was seventeen years from the issue 
date of the patent. Since 1995, patent term is twenty years from the filing date 
of the patent. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 24, at 59–60. Thus, under the cur-
rent Patent Act, even the inclusion of the issue date of the patent would be in-
sufficient to easily communicate the patent’s status. 
 97. Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1361 (alteration in original) (quoting Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159 (1989)).  
 98. Id. at 1361–62. 
 99. Id. at 1362. 
 100. Solo Cup, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 652 (quoting Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 
159); see also Pequiqnot, 608 F.3d at 1361. 
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whether a product covered by an expired patent should be 
marked.101 Moreover, in noting that the “notice requirement is 
designed ‘for the information of the public,’” the Court high-
lighted that the “detailed information concerning the claims of 
the patent holder” was “compiled in a central location” during 
the application process.102 Thus, the Supreme Court recognized 
that one of the functions of patent marking is to direct the pub-
lic to the patent documentation.103 The Court also stated that 
“the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs 
and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”104 
It would be contradictory if, even after the use of the patent 
passes to the public, disclosure of the patent’s existence was 
limited.  
In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court also reaffirmed that 
“after the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter of 
the patent passes to the free use of the public as a matter of 
federal law,”105 because “on the expiration of a patent the mo-
nopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the 
thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public proper-
ty.”106 The subject matter covered by the patent cannot be cov-
ered by another patent and the monopoly ceases to exist, but 
expiration does not mean that the original patent never existed 
or the patent no longer describes the invention. Indeed, subse-
quent patent applications related to the patented invention 
that are submitted to the Patent Office are required to refer-
ence even expired patents.107 Although expiration causes a pat-
ent to become unenforceable, it does not cause the patent to 
cease to exist.  
The Solo Cup court also failed to recognize that a patent’s 
expiration is only part of its status as intellectual property. For 
example, a Patent No. XXX imprint does not communicate the 
claims of the patent, which aspects of the product or its use are 
covered by the patent, or whether there are additional patent 
applications or patents that might cover the product. As the 
 
 101. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141–42. 
 102. Id. at 161–62 (quoting Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. 
Co., 297 U.S. 387, 397 (1936)). 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. at 151. 
 105. Id. at 152. 
 106. Id. (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)). 
 107. See Tom Brody, Duty to Disclose: Dayco Products v. Total Contain-
ment, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 325 (2008) (emphasizing the 
importance of disclosing any known relevant information to the Patent Office). 
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Supreme Court recognized in Bonito Boats, one of the functions 
of patent marking is to direct the public to the patent documen-
tation where “detailed information concerning the claims of the 
patent holder is compiled in a central location.”108 
In conclusion, nothing compelled the Federal Circuit to ex-
tend the Supreme Court’s dicta in Bonito Boats to the applica-
tion of the false marking statute. On the contrary, the functions 
of patent marking recognized by the Court in Bonito Boats ar-
gue against treating an article covered by an expired patent as 
unpatented. 
2. Statutory Interpretation: The False Marking Statute Is Not 
Unambiguous 
The Solo Cup court also held that an article covered by an 
expired patent should be considered an unpatentable article as 
a matter of statutory interpretation.109 The statute, the Federal 
Circuit concluded, was “unambiguous.”110 Curiously, the Feder-
al Circuit did not explain why it considered the statutory lan-
guage unambiguous. The term “patent” may refer to either the 
“governmental grant” of the patent rights or to the “official 
document” that describes the invention.111 Although the gov-
ernmental grant of rights has clearly ended after the patent 
has expired, the document describing the invention and grant-
ing the rights continues to exist. Thus, an article described in 
an expired patent, and marked with the number of an expired 
patent document, may be viewed as covered by a patent rather 
than “unpatented.”  
Moreover, this interpretation would not cause invalidated 
patents to be considered patented. Although the document is-
sued for an invalid patent still exists, it does not describe an 
invention.112 That is, an article described in an invalid patent is 
“unpatented” in the sense that no document describing the in-
vention exists or ever existed. In contrast, an article covered by 
an unenforceable patent is still exemplified by an official docu-
 
 108. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 161–62. 
 109. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 110. Id. at 1362.  
 111. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (8th ed. 2004); see also, e.g., Kemin 
Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales del Centro S.A. de C.V., 301 F. Supp. 2d 
970, 974 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (“A patent is a legal document that defines the 
metes and bounds of the patentee’s invention.”). 
 112. A patent may be found invalid if it fails to meet a condition for patent-
ability or does not adequately describe (enable) the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 282 
(2002). 
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ment describing an invention. In this sense, an article claimed 
in an unenforceable patent may still be viewed as covered by a 
patent.113 Therefore, an unenforceable patent is much like an 
expired patent—it continues to exist but may not be enforced—
and is distinguishable from a cancelled or annulled patent.114 
Since the statute is ambiguous and susceptible to more 
than one interpretation, the court should have adopted the con-
struction that resulted in a reasonable result consistent with 
the legislative purpose.115 As discussed below, treating articles 
covered by expired patents as patented is more consistent with 
the goals of the legislature’s patent regime. 
3. Marking with an Expired Patent Number Does Not 
Increase the Burden on the Public 
The Solo Cup court also found that requiring the public to 
determine the status of an expired patent from a patent num-
ber marked on an article “imposes on the public ‘the cost of de-
termining whether the involved patents are valid and enforcea-
ble.’”116 The court’s reasoning is in stark contrast to the 
reasoning of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in FMC Corp. 
v. Control Solutions, Inc.117 The FMC Corp. court held that al-
 
 113. In fact, many of the same policy arguments for allowing an article to 
be marked with an expired patent number can also be made for allowing an 
article to be marked with an unenforceable patent number. The patent num-
ber continues to direct the public to a source of information about the article, 
and it is relatively easy to determine the patent’s status. 
 114. 69 C.J.S. Patents § 218 (2010) (“The authority to cancel or annul a pat-
ent is vested only in the federal courts, and proceedings to cancel or annul a 
patent may be maintained only by the United States.”). A patent may be de-
clared unenforceable in a case with a private litigant, but a patent may only be 
cancelled in a case brought by the federal government. Id. 
 115. Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940) (“All statutes must 
be construed in the light of their purpose. A literal reading of them which 
would lead to absurd results is to be avoided when they can be given a reason-
able application consistent with their words and with the legislative pur-
pose.”); see also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 172 (2010) (“[I]f a statute is capable 
of being construed in different ways, that construction which works absurd or 
unreasonable result should be avoided.”). 
 116. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quot-
ing Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347,1367 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
 117. 369 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Curiously, the Solo Cup court al-
so found in a later holding that “[w]hen a product is marked with an expired 
patent number, any person with basic knowledge of the patent system can 
look up the patent and determine its expiration date.” Pequignot v. Solo Cup 
Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 798 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 
608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
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though “the Patent Act imposes a duty to mark products cov-
ered by a patent, there is no stated corresponding duty to re-
move the patent number on a product whose patent has ex-
pired.”118 The court also found “no reason” to deny a company 
the right to display an expired patent number, finding that the 
marking informed “the public of where to acquire the informa-
tion” needed to practice the invention.119  
In addition, a potential competitor or other member of the 
public may already be responsible for determining what pat-
ents might apply and if they are valid and enforceable. For ex-
ample, for a competitor interested in making a product, deter-
mining the intellectual property landscape is part of the cost of 
doing business.120 Because there is no obligation to mark,121 
and a patent number may be removed at any time (not just be-
cause of expiration), even an unmarked product may be covered 
by a valid and enforceable patent. The burden on the public is, 
in fact, less if an expired patent number is on a product than if 
no patent number is on the product because the number directs 
the public to the patent documentation.122 
The district court in Solo Cup also concluded that an ar-
ticle covered by an expired patent was “no different than an ar-
ticle that has never received protection from a patent” because 
“[b]oth are in the public domain.”123 But a never-patented ar-
ticle is not necessarily found within the public domain, and 
there is no obligation to place the invention in the public do-
main.124 In contrast, one of the inventor’s obligations in filing a 
patent is to “disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the 
 
 118. FMC Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d at 584 (citing DONALD S. CHISUM, 7 
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03[7][c] (2005)). 
 119. Id. (“This Court finds no reason why FMC may not display its [ex-
pired] patent number to inform the public of where to acquire the informational 
and teaching quid pro quo that underlies the granting of patent protection.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Walter C. Linder, Fundamentals of Successful Patent Strate-
gy Development and Administration, in DEVELOPING A PATENT STRATEGY: 
LEADING LAWYERS ON COUNSELING CLIENTS ON PATENT PROTECTION, 
EVALUATING PATENT PORTFOLIOS, AND WORKING WITH THE USPTO 1, 1 
(2010), available at 2010 WL 4460. 
 121. Cf. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 543 (imposing an obligation to 
mark). 
 122. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161–
62 (1989) (discussing the federal patent scheme’s role in providing information 
to the public about the status of intellectual property). 
 123. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 652 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
 124. Indeed, many unpatented articles in public use are protected by trade 
secret rights. Oscar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent 
Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643, 1685 (2010). 
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patent is based.”125 A patentee—even the owner of an expired 
patent—has disclosed his invention to the public. Even after a 
patent expires, an article continues to be described by the pat-
ent claims126 and referred to by its patent number, and both the 
patent and its status may be easily discovered by searching for 
the patent number found on the marked article. An article cov-
ered by an expired patent is, therefore, not unpatented in the 
same sense as an article that has never been covered by a pat-
ent. 
B. QUI TAM ACTIONS AS A MEANS TO PREVENT FALSE MARKING 
In addition to determining whether an article has been 
falsely marked, a court must also determine whether the party 
that is bringing the action has the standing to contest the 
marker’s actions. The number of parties that may bring such 
an action is significantly increased by the false marking stat-
ute’s qui tam status. The increased number of potential plain-
tiffs decreases the burden on the government to enforce proper 
marking.127 
Nevertheless, in order for a plaintiff to properly bring a qui 
tam action under the false marking statute, the false marking 
must have caused an injury to the government or the public.128 
Yet, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the marking of 
an article with an expired patent would result in an injury to 
the public or the government.129 Nevertheless, the Federal Cir-
cuit held in Stauffer v. Brooks Brothers, Inc. that almost any 
 
 125. Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Bonito 
Boats, 489 U.S. at 150 (“The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully 
crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and 
nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right 
to practice the invention for a period of years.”). 
 126. Cf. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (establishing the Federal Circuit’s test that an article must be “cov-
ered by at least one claim of each patent with which the article is marked”). 
 127. Winston, supra note 45, at 117. 
 128. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“Section 292 thus assigns . . . to ‘any person’ . . . the authority to bring 
suit to vindicate cognizable injuries incurred on the public or the United States 
through violation of its provisions.” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006))), rev’d, 
Nos. 2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419 (Fed Cir. Aug. 31, 
2010). 
 129. It is easier to imagine a situation where a single potential competitor 
might be injured, but it is difficult to believe that every potential competitor 
would fail to ascertain the status of the patent. 
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plaintiff has standing to sue because “a violation of that statute 
inherently constitutes an injury to the United States.”130  
Stauffer sued Brooks Brothers for false marking of adjust-
able men’s bow ties because Brooks Brothers continued to mark 
the bow ties with patent numbers that expired in 1954 and 
1955.131 Stauffer alleged that Brooks Brothers injured the pub-
lic because the false marking “misleads and wrongly imposes 
the costs of evaluating patents on the public”132 and “‘wrongful-
ly quelled competition with respect to . . . bow tie products 
thereby causing harm to the economy of the United States.’”133 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court and concluded 
that Stauffer’s standing arose “from his status as ‘any person’”; 
that Stauffer had “sufficiently alleged” an injury to the United 
States, caused by Brooks Brothers’s alleged conduct; and the 
injury was likely to be cured by a favorable decision.134 The 
case was remanded to the district court.135 
District courts have reached different decisions on the is-
sue of standing. Some courts have held, as the Federal Circuit 
did, that “a violation to the statute inherently constitutes an in-
jury to the United States.”136 However, other courts, including 
the district court in Stauffer, have ruled that the defendant’s 
competitors were not deterred by the marking with the expired 
patent137 and therefore competition had not been “quelled” suf-
ficiently to result in harm to the economy of the United 
 
 130. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., Nos. 2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 
2010 WL 3397419, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010). 
 131. Id. at *1. 
 132. Id. at *3. 
 133. Id. (quoting Complaint at 38, Stauffer, 615 F. Supp. 2d 248) (No. 08-
cv-10369)). 
 134. Id. at *6. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at *4; see also Shizzle Pop, LLC v. Wham-O, Inc., No. CV 10-3491 
PA (FFMx), 2010 WL 3063066, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010) (holding that 
the plaintiff had standing); Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 
728 (E.D. Va. 2009) (finding that the plaintiff had standing even though the 
only injury to the United States could only be to “its sovereignty”), aff’d in part 
and vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 137. Stauffer, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 255. The district court relied on the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife that in order to have 
standing a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete, particularized, “actual or 
imminent” injury “so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no 
injury would have occurred at all.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 564 (1992). 
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States.138 Indeed, in Stauffer, the competitors received their 
bow ties from the same supplier, and their products were iden-
tically marked.139 Therefore, it is almost impossible to imagine 
how any real injury was suffered by the public or the United 
States. 
In contrast to marking with inapplicable patent numbers, 
it is difficult to imagine how marking products with accurate, 
now-expired patent numbers “inherently constitutes an injury 
to the United States.”140 Indeed, continuing to mark an article 
allows the public and competitors to quickly determine the pat-
ented status of the product and how to copy it.141 The number 
of parties that may bring an action under the false marking 
statute is already large because the false marking statute’s qui 
tam status and the Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation. Con-
tinuing to interpret the statute to include articles covered by 
expired patents makes the statute’s reach inappropriately 
broad.  
C. THE ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF CONTINUING TO ALLOW 
ARTICLES COVERED BY EXPIRED PATENTS TO BE MARKED 
The increasing amount of false marking litigation has fo-
cused attention on the effects of allowing an article to be 
marked with an expired patent number. As noted above, mark-
ing with an expired patent number does not increase the bur-
den on the public and may, in fact, make it easier for competi-
tors to conduct patentability or marketability analyses.142  
 
 138. Stauffer, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 255; see also United States ex rel. FLFMC, 
LLC v. Wham-O, Inc., No. 10cv0435, 2010 WL 3156162, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 
3, 2010) (holding that a noncompetitor plaintiff lacked standing). 
 139. Stauffer, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 255. 
 140. Stauffer, 2010 WL 3397419, at *4. 
 141. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 798 (E.D. Va. 
2009) (“[M]arking an article with an expired patent can work to the marker’s 
detriment, because public patent documents reveal all of the previously pat-
ented design features that are now in the public domain, thus creating a road 
map for anyone wishing to legally copy the product.”), aff’d in part and vacated 
in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Searcey, supra note 2, at A1 
(describing how “it can be relatively simple” to determine if patent numbers on 
products are outdated “because patents are numbered chronologically”). 
 142. FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 539, 584 (E.D. 
Pa. 2005) (“This Court finds no reason why FMC may not display its [expired] 
patent number to inform the public of where to acquire the informational and 
teaching quid pro quo that underlies the granting of patent protection.”); see 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2126 (8th. ed., rev. 8, 2010) (assuming the general availability of 
patents as prior art for the purposes of the USPTO). 
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In addition, extending the term “unpatented article” to 
cover items once protected by a valid patent has already 
created a new litigation threat with “potentially devastating 
consequences.”143 A large number of these types of cases have 
already been filed, and the damages being demanded are in the 
billions of dollars.144  
Including articles covered by expired patents in the defini-
tion of “unpatented article” is also creating an incentive not to 
mark.145 In fact, 35 U.S.C. § 287 creates in a patent holder an 
“obligation to mark its product consistently and continuously in 
order to provide constructive notice of the patent.”146 Congress 
designed § 287 so that a patentee can only recover damages for 
infringing sales that occurred after it gave notice of its patent 
rights147 in order to “encourage the patentee to give notice to 
the public of the patent.”148 Because a manufacturer is required 
to mark a product to satisfy the notice requirements of § 287, a 
manufacturer must balance the danger of being sued for inac-
curately marking with having the ability to sue for infringe-
ment.149 The continued prospect of potential litigation created 
by extending the false marking statute to cover articles pro-
tected by now-expired patents will quickly spoil the incentive to 
 
 143. Remus & Bjella, supra note 58, at 110 (noting the potential for 
“enormous damage awards”); Oblon, supra note 87 (theorizing that damages 
could run “into [the] billions of dollars”); Brian C. Riopelle & Steven D. Hamil-
ton, False Marking Claims for Products Stamped with Expired Patents, Legal 
Updates, MCGUIREWOODS (June 16, 2009), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/ 
news-resources/item.asp?item=4051; see also Searcey, supra note 2, at A1 (not-
ing that such findings could result in extreme damage awards).  
 144. Gene Quinn, Apple and Others Sued for $60 Billion+ for False Patent 
Marking, IP WATCHDOG (July 31, 2010, 1:51 PM), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/ 
07/31/apple-sued-false-patent-marking/id=11858/. The plaintiff in these suits, 
Americans for Fair Patent Use, is an LLC formed by an intellectual property 
boutique in Austin, Texas. Robbins, supra note 84. 
 145. See, e.g., Searcey, supra note 2, at A1 (noting that increased litigation 
has resulted in at least one attorney advising his clients not to mark, even 
though that means the clients cannot seek damages for infringement). 
 146. Forest Group, Inc., v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206, 
at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 590 F.3d 
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 147. Id. 
 148. Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 
1993). 
 149. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and its Alter-
natives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 834–45 (2002) (discuss-
ing the rights, benefits, and pitfalls of patent marking to the marker and its 
competitor). 
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mark created by § 287, resulting in a decreased incidence of 
marking.150  
Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that a patentee who 
innocently marks a product with an expired patent will be pro-
tected from the costs of litigation by the intent requirement of 
the false marking statute.151 Although the intent requirement 
may protect the patentee from a court’s imposition of liability, 
discovery and litigation may stretch for months or even 
years,152 at considerable cost to the marking company. 
Excluding articles marked with expired patent numbers 
from the meaning of unpatented article is necessary to prevent 
additional litigation against patent owners who innocently 
mark products with expired patent numbers, to prevent the de-
velopment of incentives not to mark, and to create the national 
uniformity that the patent system relies on.153 
III.  EXCLUDING PRODUCTS COVERED BY EXPIRED 
PATENTS FROM THE MEANING OF “UNPATENTED 
ARTICLE”   
Third parties’ attempts to profit from the qui tam provision 
in the false marking statute by challenging products labeled 
with expired patents is developing into a huge liability for 
manufacturers. Yet patentees rely on the notice function of pat-
ent marking to protect them from infringers and to provide no-
tice in infringement suits. In order to promote the notice func-
tions of marking and to ensure the proper use of the informer 
action, the Federal Circuit should reverse its recent holding to 
exclude products covered by expired patents from the meaning 
of “unpatented article.” Alternatively, Congress should amend 
 
 150. See, e.g., Oblon, supra note 87; Riopelle & Hamilton, supra note 143. 
 151. A requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 292(a), is that the marker must have af-
fixed the patent number with the “purpose of deceiving the public.” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 292(a) (2006). 
 152. See, e.g., Arcadia Mach. & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 
1124, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Arcadia had totally failed, after at least nine 
months of discovery, to produce any evidence of intent to deceive the public.”). 
The litigation in Solo Cup lasted over a year before the court found that there 
was “not a scintilla of evidence that Solo ever . . . manifested any actual decep-
tive intent.” Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 799 (E.D. Va. 
2009), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 153. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 
(1989) (“One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright 
Clauses of the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the realm of 
intellectual property.”). 
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the false marking statute and protect the informer action by 
explicitly excluding expired patents from the statute’s coverage. 
A. PRECEDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR ONCE PATENTED IS ALWAYS 
PATENTED 
Articles covered by once-valid-but-now-expired patents and 
marked with the numbers of those expired patents should not 
be considered unpatented articles for the purposes of the false 
marking statute. Legislative history and judicial precedent—
until the Federal Circuit’s recent holdings—support the conclu-
sion that an article once patented is always patented.  
Congress initially established the false marking statute to 
prevent a person from marking as patented “any thing . . . [for] 
which he hath not or shall not have obtained letters patent.”154 
Nothing in this language suggests that lawmakers meant the 
statute to be extended to cover articles for which a patent was 
obtained but has now expired. Moreover, nothing in the revi-
sions to the statute or the legislative history implies that Con-
gress intended to expand the statute to cover anything other 
than articles that have never been patented.155 
Treating articles covered by the claim of an expired patent 
as patented articles is consistent with the interpretation of the 
false marking statute in prior case law. For example, in Wilson 
v. Singer Manufacturing Co., an Illinois court held that Singer 
had not violated the false marking statute by labeling its sew-
ing machines with plates stating that the machine was pat-
ented, even though the patents had expired.156 Similarly, in Ar-
cadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., the Federal 
Circuit held that the patentee, Ruger, did not violate the false 
marking statute even though it had included expired patents 
 
 154. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5, 5 Stat. 543, 544 (1842). 
 155. See H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2403 (describing § 292 as being minimally revised but maintaining it 
such that it relates “to falsely marking an article as being patented when it 
was not patented, which is now the present law”); cf. Patent Reform Act of 
2010, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 146(k)(1) (2010) (restricting plaintiffs to those who 
can show that they have suffered a competitive injury). If passed, this legisla-
tion would effectively eliminate the entire group of plaintiffs seeking to enforce 
the false marking statute against those marking articles with expired patent 
numbers. Joshua M. Dalton & Deana El-Mallawany, Recent Wave of False 
Marking Lawsuits Highlights Need to Monitor Patent Marking Practices, 
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.bingham.com/Media 
.aspx?MediaID=10466. 
 156. Wilson v. Singer Mfg. Co., 12 F. 57, 58–59 (N.D. Ill. 1882). 
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on its products’ labels.157 In Clontech Laboratories, Inc. v. Invi-
trogen Corp., the Federal Circuit held that “unpatented article” 
means that “the article in question is not covered by at least 
one claim of each patent with which the article is marked.”158 
Even after a valid patent expires, the claims of a patent contin-
ue to read on the article. Furthermore, even though the subject 
of the patent passes into the public domain, the subject matter 
remains described and exemplified in the patent claims.159 
Thus, there exists a statutory interpretation whereby articles 
covered by an expired patent are still patented. Holding that 
articles covered by expired patents are not “unpatented ar-
ticles” would be consistent with this judicial precedent. In addi-
tion to legislative and judicial precedent, public policy strongly 
supports a holding that once patented is always patented. 
B. POLICY SUPPORT FOR ONCE PATENTED IS ALWAYS PATENTED 
Considering an article covered by an expired patent as pat-
ented is consistent with the purposes of the false marking stat-
ute. Marking products as patented helps direct the public to the 
patent documentation where “detailed information concerning 
the claims of the patent holder is compiled in a central loca-
tion.”160 Allowing products covered by the claims of a patent to 
be marked with that patent number facilitates this public no-
tice function of patents.  
Moreover, marking with an expired patent number does 
not destroy the public notice function of marking. Some have 
suggested that the public and competitors alike interpret a pat-
ent number as being evidence of an enforceable—not expired—
patent.161 However, unlike a product that has never been pat-
 
 157. Arcadia Mach. & Tool, 786 F.2d at 1125. 
 158. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
 159. Compare Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 152 (1989) (“[O]n the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it 
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent 
becomes public property.” (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 
169, 185 (1896))), with id. at 151 (“[T]he ultimate goal of the patent system is 
to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclo-
sure.”). Indeed, many infringement suits continue to be litigated long after the 
patent has expired, and the information contained within those claims contin-
ues to act as prior art for the purposes of future patents. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102 (2006); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 142, § 706.02(a). 
 160. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 161–62. 
 161. E.g., Amended Complaint for False Patent Marking, supra note 8, at 
4; see also Grant, supra note 42, at 283 (“There are two harmful effects. 
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ented, a product covered by an expired patent still possesses 
the features that caused it to be patentable.162 A consumer is 
not deceived as to the article’s fitness for patenting when it is 
marked with an expired patent number.163 The “character and 
value of the article” do not change when a patent expires.164 
Commentators have also argued that the public assumes that 
an article marked with a patent number is more valuable.165 In 
fact, an article’s fitness for patenting can bear little relation to 
its commercial value or usefulness because an invention may 
meet the utility requirement even when it is not superior to the 
prior art.166 
Moreover, marking with the patent number—even if it is 
expired—permits the public to determine the patents that ap-
ply to the article, locate them, and determine their status.167 
For most patents, it is possible for anyone with experience with 
patents to determine if a patent has expired and entered the 
public domain.168 Being able to locate the applicable patents 
 
. . . First, incorrect marking may deter scientific research when an inventor 
sees a mark and decides to forgo continued research to avoid an infringement 
action. Second, incorrect marking may deceive consumers and harm the indus-
try when the public purchases products based on the mark.”); Winston, supra 
note 45, at 127–28 (noting that because the patent issue date is no longer re-
quired to be marked, harm results to the public because they must now re-
search every patent to see if it is currently valid). 
 162. See Oliphant v. Salem Flouring Mills Co., 18 F. Cas. 647, 647–48 (D. 
Or. 1878) (No. 10,486) (“[T]he word ‘patent’ upon an article is prima facie an 
assertion that it has some peculiar value or merit . . . . The impression which 
the fact ordinarily makes upon the mind is, that the article marked ‘patent’ is 
in some respects more useful or desirable than articles of the same general 
kind or use which are not so marked.”). 
 163. See id. (noting that only if an item is originally patentable will a pat-
ent be granted). 
 164. See id. at 648 (“If, then, a person marks an unpatented article with 
the word ‘patent,’ the public are thereby liable to be deceived as to the charac-
ter and value of the article.”). 
 165. See, e.g., id. at 647–48 (noting that an item marked with the word “pat-
ent” denotes a value that is perceived by the public to be more valuable in 
some respects than an item which does not contain the word); Grant, supra 
note 42, at 289 (“The existence of a patent could cause a consumer to believe 
that the product is of superior quality to other products on the market without 
a patent mark . . . .”). 
 166. 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 145 (2010). 
 167. See Ameet Sachdev, Manufacturers Face Patent-Suit Headaches: Re-
cent Ruling Raises Potential Bounty for Consumers Alleging ‘False Marks’ on 
Goods, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 2010, at C17, available at 2010 WLNR 4329031 
(“[I]t takes only a matter of minutes to determine whether a patent has run 
out . . . .”). 
 168. Cf. Solo Cup Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 9 (arguing that Solo’s 
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may even be an advantage to a competitor.169 First, marking 
can direct competitors to the enabling disclosure contained in 
the patent application.170 Second, a careful manufacturer 
searches the prior art for applicable patents during develop-
ment in order to prevent infringement.171 There is much to 
suggest that the public and competitors should not rely on pat-
ent marking alone to determine a product’s intellectual proper-
ty status.172 Nevertheless, when a product is marked with rele-
vant patents, a searcher will be able to determine more easily 
what the patents cover, their status, and their relationship to 
other potentially applicable patents.173 Thus, marking an ar-
ticle with an expired patent number does not destroy the public 
notice function but may even provide additional information 
and advantages to the public and potential competitors. By en-
suring that articles covered by an expired patent are considered 
patented articles for the purposes of the false marking statute, 
ongoing marking will be encouraged, bolstering the public no-
tice function of the statute. 
Holding that articles covered by the claims of expired pat-
ents are patented will also generate ancillary benefits. These 
benefits include allowing the patentee or marker of the product 
to provide useful information without imposing an undue bur-
den on the public; preventing the development of incentives not 
to mark; averting exploitative litigation such as Solo Cup; and 
limiting the enforcement of the false marking statute to viola-
tions that have the potential to cause serious harm to the pub-
lic. In contrast, treating articles covered by the claims of ex-
pired patents will encourage an astonishing amount of 
 
mark provided an easy way for a potential competitor to determine the status 
of the patent). 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 120, at *1 (“Virtually any business in-
volved in the development, manufacture, or distribution of products, services, 
or information will benefit from a patent and intellectual property strategy.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 42, passim (explaining that proper mark-
ing is not mandatory nor does it apply to pending patent applications); John 
LaBarre & Xavier Gómez-Velasco, Ready, Set, Mark Your Patented Software!, 
RICHMOND J.L. & TECH., 6 (Fall 2005), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v12i1/article3 
.pdf (explaining that there is no marking requirement if the patent covers a 
process). 
 173. See Neil S. Hirshman & Rashmi Chandra, Intellectual Property Due 
Diligence Methodology, in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD 
COMPANY 2001, at 9, 11 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 
B0-00Z0, 2001) (describing an analysis of a patent portfolio). 
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exploitative litigation.174 Lawsuits such as Solo Cup are being 
brought by patent-marking trolls—individuals who do not own 
patents, but who look for high-volume products that might re-
sult in large penalty recoveries.175 Yet, the holding in Solo Cup 
resulted in the formation of companies simply to file these cas-
es.176 The attempts by these plaintiffs to use the false marking 
statute to extract “significant amounts of money from compa-
nies”177 are contrary to the purposes of the qui tam aspect of 
the false marking statute.  
The informer aspect of the false marking statute is in-
tended to offers rewards “to accomplish outlawing of fraudulent 
and illegal acts to the public detriment,”178 not as a money-
making scheme for private parties. Where false marking of an 
article does create “an actual or imminent injury in fact to 
competition, to the United States economy, or the public,”179 the 
false marking statute provides a valuable enforcement provi-
sion. However, allowing this action to be misused by patent 
trolls weakens the false marking statute and creates needlessly 
costly litigation. 
 
 174. See Susan Decker, Firms Fight Outbreak of Patent Lawsuits: Pfizer, 
P&G Accused of Falsely Marking Items, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 28, 
2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 4222330 (describing the “explosion” in the 
number of patent false marking cases filed after the Federal Circuit’s recent 
decision that a manufacturer “may face a penalty of up to $500 for every item 
that’s falsely marked”). 
 175. Rupert, supra note 29, at 3 (“[A] ‘troll’ is [sic] pejorative term describ-
ing a non-manufacturing patent owner who owns one or more patents and as-
serts the patent(s) against alleged infringers, with a desire typically to obtain 
settlement rather than actually trying any lawsuit.”); see also Matthew Mar-
quardt, A New Breed of Patent Troll? False Patent Marking in the US, 
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g= 
b20b6e5f-d408-4364-9cc4-ab648bb8d70c (referring to these plaintiffs as 
“marking trolls”); Erik Sherman, Trolls Target Patent Marking with a Trillion 
Dollar Lawsuit, BNET (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.bnet.com/blog/technology 
-business/trolls-target-patent-markings-with-a-trillion-dollar-lawsuit/2723 (dis-
cussing the new type of patent troll). 
 176. Robbins, supra note 84 (describing the formation of Americans for Fair 
Patent Use by an intellectual property boutique and the Patent Compliance 
Group by an attorney). These companies, formed for the purpose of filing false 
marking suits, have filed dozens of suits in 2010. See McDonnell, Boehnen, 
Hulbert & Berghoff, LLP, supra note 2 (listing recent false marking suits filed 
across the country). 
 177. Rupert, supra note 29, at 4. 
 178. Calderwood v. Mansfield, 71 F. Supp. 480, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1947). 
 179. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009), rev’d, Nos. 2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419 (Fed. 
Cir. Aug. 31, 2010). 
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C. A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE FALSE MARKING 
STATUTE 
The Federal Circuit’s decision that an “offense” in 35 
U.S.C. § 292 should be defined on a per article basis180 firmly 
established a financial motivation for plaintiffs to sue under 
the qui tam provision of the false marking statute. The ruling 
in Solo Cup that an article covered by an expired patent is an 
unpatented article181 overly broadened the false marking cause 
of action. Either Congress or the Federal Circuit should act to 
limit the qui tam provision and arrest the current trend to-
wards exploitative litigation. 
The Federal Circuit is uniquely positioned to prevent fur-
ther additional litigation by explicitly holding that articles cov-
ered by expired patents are not “unpatented articles” for the 
purposes of the false marking statute. Failure by the Federal 
Circuit to act is likely to induce extensive legislative restric-
tions on this qui tam action, potentially resulting in the loss of 
a mechanism to enforce the proper use of a patent marking.182 
Nevertheless, if the Federal Circuit fails to act, Congress 
should take decisive action to protect the informer action by 
amending the false marking statute to clarify that it excludes 
articles covered by expired patents. This conservative interpre-
tation of the statute by the Federal Circuit or Congress would 
restrict the enforcement of the false marking statute to viola-
tions that have the potential to cause serious harm to the pub-
lic and would preserve incentives to mark. 
  CONCLUSION   
The recent spate of litigation by third parties using the 
false marking statute against the makers of articles covered by 
expired patents presents a significant financial risk for patent-
ees. If this litigation is allowed to continue, it will create incen-
tives for manufacturers not to mark their products, contraven-
ing the public notice function of the patent act. The Federal 
Circuit or Congress should act to prevent labeling articles cov-
ered by valid but now-expired patents from being false mark-
 
 180. Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 181. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 182. All but two other American qui tam actions have been repealed. See 
DOYLE, supra note 30, at 4. Proposed legislation would entirely remove the qui 
tam action from § 292. See Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, 111th Cong. 
§ 146(k)(1) (2010) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) to require competitive injury 
for a plaintiff to bring suit); see also Brown & Jones, supra note 37. 
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ing. This exclusion is consistent with legislative and judicial 
precedent as well as public and patent policy. In addition, this 
limitation will prevent the development of incentives not to 
mark and avert exploitative litigation. 
